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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PRIOR USER RIGHTS FOR BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

ROBERT C. HALDIMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
The American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) introduces
substantial changes in several aspects of the United States patent system,
including the creation of a “First Inventor Defense.” “Prior User Rights” of
varying scope have long been debated as a reform to the patent system as a
whole.1 The 1998 holding in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc.2 allowing the patenting of “Business Methods” proved
to be the catalyst for passage of the form of Prior User Rights legislation in the
AIPA.3 For guidance as to patent claims and defendants that qualify for the
new special rights, the AIPA offers only the following ambiguity: “[t]he term
‘method’ means a method of doing or conducting business.”4
The legislative history of the AIPA reflects the dynamic tension between
the advocates and opponents of Prior User Rights. The Committee report,
debate and hearings contain language to support both the limitation of the new
personal defense to cases asserting patents considered to be “Business
Methods,” for example, with respect to patents under United States Patent and

* Mr. Robert C. Haldiman practices patent law at Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, Missouri.
Rhaldiman@thompsoncoburn.com.
1. See, e.g., Hearings on Prior User Rights before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and
Judicial Admin., 102nd Cong. 1992 (1994); Kyla Harriel, Prior User Rights and the First to
Invent Patent System: Why Not?, 36 IDEA 543 (1996); Lisa Brownlee, Trade Secret Use of
Patentable Inventions, Prior User Rights and Patent Law Harmonization, 72 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 523 (1990); Gary Griswold et al., Prior User Rights: Neither A Rose
Nor a Thorn; 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 233 (1994); Gary Griswold & F. Andrew Ubel, Prior
User Rights: A Necessary Part of a First-to-File System, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567 (1993).
See also infra note 108.
2. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
3. The general consequences and wisdom of segregating a particular subject matter for
different rights and procedures is beyond the scope of this article. It is notable that plants,
computer chips (mask works) and designs are the subject of entirely separate statutes, which are
clearly defined. Medical methods have been treated separately within 35 U.S.C. Chapter 7, but
are a far smaller and less contentious area than Business Method Patents currently are.
4. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3)
(1999).
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Trademark Office (USPTO) Class 7055 and the expansive application of the
defense to any method of conducting a company’s business, including
manufacturing processes.
Since the State Street Bank decision in 1998, Business Method Patents
have been perceived to be available as 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter per se.6
The case has engendered a race to the USPTO to claim patent estates on
technology heretofore primarily protected only by trade secret law. The
specter of second comers to a technology enjoining good faith prior inventors
merely by beating them to the patent office motivated the 1999 reforms.7
While the circumstances prompting the reform are well known, it has been
left for the courts to define the extent and contours of what “methods of doing
or conducting business” are subject to the reforms. Litigants will have strong
strategic incentives to characterize patents asserted in infringement actions as
business methods, or not. Tactics will be complicated by the fact that Prior
User Rights do not invalidate the patent.8 In defending a non-Business Method
Patent, prior art qualifying under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) can invalidate the asserted
patent. Further complicating a defense against infringement claims based on
patents, which may or may not be “business method” patents is the fact that
assertions of Section 102(g) prior art, often understood as “secret” prior art,
have not enjoyed the benefit of clear, non-contradictory case law in all
circumstances.9 Finally, a defendant is free to assert Prior User Rights and
Section 102(g) invalidity against the method claims of the same or related
patents and Section 102(g) invalidity against the apparatus claims
simultaneously.
Some commentators have criticized the new AIPA for endorsing trade
secret protection, discouraging disclosure, assigning different rights to
different classes of patents and for the uncertainty of the AIPA in its failure to
define its own scope.10 The creation of a patent system in which different
rights will apply to different classes of subject matter raises concerns for all
practitioners, especially since the dividing line between the different classes is
unknown.
This article reviews the provisions of the AIPA. The arguments for broad
application of the new defense will be reviewed and found to be less than

5. Class 705 consists of Data processing: Financial, Business Practice, Management, or
Cost/Price Determination, at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/def/705.htm (last
modified Oct. 6, 2000).
6. See infra note 169, for a discussion on the history of the Business Method Patent.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 71 - 106, for a discussion on legislative history.
8. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(9) (1999).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 144 - 156, for a discussion on § 102 case law. See
also infra text accompanying notes 144 - 49.
10. James R. Barney, The Prior User Defense: A Reprieve for Trade Secret Owners or a
Disaster for the Patent Law?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 261 (2000).
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compelling. Moreover, the background, including the legislative history,
behind the AIPA will be examined. It will reveal a consensus that Prior User
Rights should apply to State Street Bank and e-commerce type Business
Method Patents and sharp conflict over any application beyond that.
Significantly, the legislative history will also show that the “substance” of the
type of the technology at issue should prevail over the form of the patent
claims covering it when deciding if the new defense applies.
Additionally, avenues will be explored through which the scope of the new
defense may be defined, including further legislation, the USPTO classification
system and judicial construction. Furthermore, the history of the Business
Method Patent exception will be outlined to shed light on what technology
developers and patent practitioners consider the subject to include. A range
will be found from a narrow reading of Business Method Patents only as those
patents without novelty beyond the accounting methods or logistics solutions
they execute, a broader reading including data processing and a still broader
reading encompassing the software that actuates the business methods.
Broadest of all is the Prior User Rights advocate’s goal of including all 35
U.S.C. § 100(b) processes.
Finally, the case law construing 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) will be reviewed. That
section provides for the invalidity of a patent for lack of novelty if a prior user
had reduced the same invention to practice, unless that prior user had
“suppressed or concealed” her version of the invention. If the prior use was
“suppressed or concealed,” as by a trade secret, Section 102(g) subordinates
the prior user to the patent rights of the later inventor who disclosed the
technology by filing for a patent. Application of the rule has not been so
simple. Case law blurs Section 102(g)’s would be bright line rule by
distinguishing between prior uses that inform the public to some extent and
those that do not inform at all. In the former case, some prior users have
successfully invalidated later patents.
In conclusion, a concordance is suggested between the public disclosure
inherent in the exercise of software implemented Business Methods and the
Section 102(g) case laws efforts to balance the policy of encouraging
disclosure with any equities due a prior inventor who elects not to patent.
Since this equitable balance is the stated goal of the First Inventor Defense, it
is further suggested that defining the scope of that defense in view of Section
102(g) evaluation of the degree to which a prior use informed the public may
provide a method for construing the new defense that does the least violence to
the traditional patent system and provides greater certainty in its application.
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II. PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE UNDER THE AIPA
A.

Generally

The 1999 legislation enacts several significant reforms in U.S. patent
practice, including new provisions such as publication of applications after
eighteen months from filing,11 special protection for individual inventors12 and
Prior User Rights for Business Method Patents.13 It also refines some old
provisions, such as limited interpartes re-examination14 and term extensions for
“USPTO” delays.15 The primary focus of this paper is the Prior User Rights
Defense for Business Method Patents.
The Prior User Rights provision is limited to “methods of doing or
conducting business.”16 The defense is personal and available only to an entity
that reduces to practice and commercially uses the subject Business Method
technology.17 Establishment of the defense does not invalidate the patent
asserted against it.18
The defense is established as follows: a defendant must have acted in good
faith;19 the defendant must have actually reduced the invention to practice at
least one year before the effective filing date of the asserted patent;20 and the
method must have been commercially used before the filing date of the
asserted patent.21 “Commercial use” means use in the United States, “. . .in
connection with an internal commercial use or an actual arms-length sale or
other arms-length commercial transfer of a useful end result, whether or not the
subject matter at issue is accessible to or otherwise known to the public . . . .”22
Premarketing regulatory review is within the scope of commercial use under
the Act.23 Nonprofit researchers’ use by universities or hospitals, for example,
qualifies as commercial use.24 Nonprofit use may be asserted as a defense only

11. AIPA, § 4500, 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1999).
12. AIPA, § 4101, 35 U.S.C. § 297 (1999).
13. AIPA, § 4301, 35 U.S.C. § 273 (1999).
14. AIPA, § 4600, 35 U.S.C. § 311-18 (1999).
15. AIPA, § 4402, 35 U.S.C. § 155 (1999).
16. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (1999).
17. Id. § 273(b)(6).
18. Id. § 273(b)(9).
19. Id. § 273(b)(1).
20. Id. § 273(b)(1). This bright line limitation coincides with § 102(b)’s one-year period that
bars patentability if the technology has been publicly used, sold or offered for sale by anyone,
including the patent applicant, more than one year before filing.
21. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (1999).
22. Id. § 273(a)(1).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 273(a)(2).
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by the nonprofit entity and such a defensible use may not be subsequently
licensed out for commercial use.25
Methods defensible under the AIPA may not have been derived from the
patentee or its privities.26 Abandonment of use abandons the defense as well,
although revival of the use may qualify if the limitations of the Act are met by
the revived activity, without reliance on the pre-abandonment activities.27 The
defense may not be transferred unless it is an, “. . .ancillary and subordinate
part of a good faith assignment or transfer for other reasons of the entire
enterprise or line of business to which the defense relates.”28 In such cases of
transferred operations, the defense only applies at those sites at which the
method is in use.29 “Site” is not defined under the AIPA.30
Products of processes immunized by Prior User Rights may be bought
without subjecting the buyer to an infringement action based on the covering
patent from which the process is immune. Patent rights subject to the defense
may not be asserted against the buyer or user of a protected product or service
generated with use of the defensible method. “The sale or other disposition of
a useful end product by a patented method shall exhaust the patent owners
rights under the patent to the extent such rights would have been exhausted had
such sale or other disposition been made by the patent owner.”31
The defendant has the burden of establishing the defense by clear and
convincing evidence.32 If unsuccessful and without a “reasonable basis for
asserting the defense” the court “shall” find the case exceptional for awarding
attorneys fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.33
Importantly, the defense is to be asserted on a claim by claim basis.34 The
defense is “not a general license under all claims of the patent at issue, but
extends only to the specific subject matter claimed in the patent with respect to
which the person can assert a defense under this chapter. . .”35 Presumably, the
non-invalidity provision, which states, “a patent shall not be deemed to be
invalid under Section 102 or Section 103 of this title solely because a defense

25. Id. § 273(a)(2)(a) & (b).
26. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3)(b) (1999).
27. Id. § 273(b)(5).
28. Id. § 273(b)(6).
29. Id. § 273(b)(7).
30. It remains to be seen if the pervasive e-commerce patents, which lie at the heart of the
Business Method Patent controversy, will be subject to the defense according to the bricks and
mortar “site” of an e-commerce business office, or the virtual “site” of that business’ URL.
31. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(2) (1999).
32. Id. § 273 (b)(4).
33. Id. § 273(b)(8).
34. Id. § 273(b)(3)(c).
35. Id.
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is raised or established under this section,”36 will also be applied on a claim by
claim basis.
The “First Inventor Defense” has been available in actions begun after
November 28, 1999.37 There is no provision in the Act mandating an election
between affirmative defenses, although the prior user rights are clearly
intended to apply where 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) prior uses have been “suppressed
and concealed,” which formerly prevented prior trade secrets from invalidating
later patents.
B.

Applying the Act’s New Defense

The new Act has been carefully crafted to mesh with the existing statutory
framework, although that precision in drafting was not achieved in the
contentious area of defining the breadth of the prior user right. The defense is
designed to apply only to trade secrets.38 The method must be reduced to
practice and in commercial use more than one year before the filing of the
asserted patent. If not a trade secret, subject technology would be Section
102(a) art (known or used), Section 102(b) art (in public use or on sale) or
Section 102(g) art (made by another). The Act is further consistent with
Section 102(g) by containing its own abandonment clause, which vitiates the
defense, just as abandonment vitiates any opportunity to invalidate an asserted
patent under Section 102(g). Hence, the new defense is designed to fit within
the “suppressed and concealed” exception to Section 102(g) art.
Although the new defense is expressly intended to protect those who elect
trade secret protection over patenting,39 the defense does not require that those
asserting it establish any element of trade secret qualification typically required
by state law. If a method is in commercial use it will qualify, whether
reasonable steps have been implemented to guard its secrecy or not. It is
assumed that if the other Section 102 invalidating defenses are available, they
will be asserted as alternative affirmative defenses. Hence the body of law that
will be brought to bear on the issue of whether a defendant’s or third party’s

36. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(9) (1999) (emphasis added). A logical reading of the
word “patent” in § 273(b)(9) is that it be in accord with the word “claims” in § 273(b)(3)(c) that
is, that invalidity is also on a claim by claim basis. But this would afford defendants the
tantalizing opportunity to have their cake and eat it too. Some claims may be defended with Prior
User Rights, while broader claims may be subject to invalidation attempts under § 102(g) with the
same technology and record of reduction to practice.
37. AIPA, § 4303, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1999).
38. If not secret, a § 102(b) bar would apply. See American Inventors’ Protection Act:
Hearings on H.R. 1225 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., 106th Cong. 180
(1999) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Ronald J. Stern, President Patent Office Professional
Assoc.).
39. See id. at 78, 94 (statement by Michael K. Balmer & Norman Kirk); 145 CONG. REC.
S13259 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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prior practice is a personal (secret) prior use or a invalidating public use will be
Section 102(g) case law, which is not thoroughly developed.40
The problems created by the “First Inventor Defense”41 Prior User Right’s
statute are immediately manifest. Disclosure is discouraged when secrecy is
rewarded. Uncertainty is rife as long as a “method of doing or conducting
business” remains undefined. An immediate concern is whether “method”
broadly means Section 100(b) “process” claiming convention,42 or narrowly
means Business Method subject matter, like Class 705, whether claimed as an
apparatus or a method. If the AIPA is construed broadly as covering Section
100(b) process claiming, the practitioner faced with suit will be forced into the
untenable position of arguing that the accused technology is the same as the
patentee plaintiff’s technology in order to use the safe harbor of Prior User
Rights, while simultaneously arguing that the technology is different to avoid
infringing the apparatus claims. Moreover, if broadly construed, this
conundrum will be faced even when subject matter clearly within Class 705 is
in litigation.43
III. BACKGROUND
A.

Introduction

The United States patent system is unique in the world in that it awards
priority to the first to invent. Like much in American jurisprudence, the
substantive justice of applying that principle comes at a cost. The interference
system of establishing priority is slow, costly and most frequently awards the
patent to the first to file anyway.44 The rest of the world awards patents to the

40. Notably, the date of actual invention is irrelevant to the defense. The patentee’s filing
date is compared to the defendant’s date of commercial use. This promotes certainty for attorney
clearance opinions regarding issued or published patents.
41. It is generally accepted that the “first inventor defense” is a misnomer since use, not
invention, is the requirement for the defense. If a first and second user both elect trade secret
protection, the second user may assert the defense against a third user/first patent applicant,
although the second user did not invent. See Hearings, supra note 39, at 180 (statement of
Ronald J. Stern, President Patent Office Professional Assoc.). “Prior User Rights” as used in this
article will refer to the “First Inventor Defense.”
42. The definition used in the original draft of the Act, H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999).
43. Conversely, it is easy to conceive of a fact pattern where “abandoned, suppressed or
concealed” are issues of fact and where defense counsel has mixed factual grounds from which he
could argue that the apparatus claims asserted are invalid for unconcealed § 102(g) art, or the
method claims are defensible for concealed § 273 art based on the same prior use.
44. See Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, Hearings on H.R. 4978-S.2605 Joint Hearings
Before Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House
Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. and Admin., 102nd Cong. 83 (1992) (statement
by Robert P. Merges), summarized in 44 BNA PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J., May 7,
1992, at 3 [hereinafter Patent Harmonization Act].
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first to file and, in most industrial countries, when that results in a potential
injustice to a prior inventor, that inventor is granted immunity from an
infringement action through Prior User Rights. By comparison, the U.S. has
always had the strongest Prior User Rights in that the system awards the entire
patent estate, not merely a defense, to the first to invent, provided that the first
inventor elects to file.
In application, this system presents an inventor with a choice: disclose and
patent or protect the technology as a trade secret and risk being enjoined by a
second comer who patents.45 It is this choice between the vulnerability of
trade secret protection and the expense of patenting that the advocates of Prior
User Rights in the United States seek to obviate. In an increasingly global
economy, advocates argue that it is unfair for foreign corporations to have
domestic Prior User Rights insulating them from foreign patents owned by
U.S. corporations, when U.S. corporations have remained vulnerable to foreign
owners of U.S. patents who can enjoin domestic corporations’ domestic
practice of their own technology.46 Patent protection, they argue further, is so
expensive that protecting all patentable technology is cost prohibitive.47 It is
common to patent the most valuable technology and conceal as trade secrets
supportive methods or technology of more marginal value. Although it does
not necessarily follow that foreign corporations will incur the expense of
patenting here in all of the cases where a domestic inventor has elected cheap,
risky trade secret protection, Prior User Rights advocates quantify their
position by citing a foreign presence in the U.S. markets of 11%, while 46% of
U.S. patents are awarded to foreigners.48
The Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations spurred the
introduction in 1992 of the Patent Harmonization Act,49 which never passed
into law. The prior user right debate was pursued, heard and legislation drafted
to introduce prior user rights in the United States. This draft legislation
included limits on and requirements for asserting the defense, including
commercial use and the inclusion of technology whose commercial use was
delayed by the regulatory process.
While the transactional costs of establishing broad Prior User Rights in the
first to invent United States patent system is acknowledged, advocates insisted
that the cost would be justified. They failed, however, to overcome their
45. Note that a third choice is to create a “freedom to operate” by publicly disclosing the
new development.
46. See Hearings, supra note 39, at 78, 94 (statement by Michael K. Balmer & Norman
Kirk).
47. Id.
48. See Hearings, supra note 39, at 225 (statement of National Association of
Manufacturers). See also Prior Domestic Commercial Use Act, H.R. 2235, 104th Cong. (1995),
which also did not pass.
49. H.R. 4978, 102nd Cong. (1992); S. 2605, 102nd Cong. (1992).
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opponents. Stalemate continued until the advent of the State Street Bank case
in July 1998. State Street Bank was anticipated to be the final nail in the coffin
of Gottshalk v. Benson50 which held that software (computer algorithms) was
unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.51 The State Street Bank
court held that as long as software provided “a useful, concrete and tangible
result[,]”52 it was patentable subject matter. But the State Street Bank court
went on to make the unanticipated move of addressing the “exception” from
patentability of Business Methods. “We take this opportunity to lay this illconceived exception to rest.”53
State Street Bank reviewed the case law often cited in support of the
proposition that Business Methods were unpatentable. The court found that
those holdings were based on a straightforward application of Sections 102 and
103 invalidity arising from the prior art. Anticipating the law, in 1995 the
USPTO removed the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) section
stating that Business Methods were not patentable on subject matter grounds.54
Following the State Street Bank holding, the USPTO issued a White Paper
that more thoroughly debunked the myth that any case had denied a business
method patentability on Section 101 subject matter grounds.55 Despite the fact
that business method unpatentability was mere dictum, the relevant community
of practitioners and technology developers had always accepted the “rule” at
face value. Whereas the expected holding of State Street Bank regarding the
patentability of software was an incremental step in a continuum,56 the
abrogation of the business method exception came as something of a
revelation. Coincidentally, the development of the Internet was exploding and
the already developed body of programming art was being brought to bear
upon it. The response to the elimination of the perceived rule against patenting

50. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
51. A quarter century of caselaw eroding this holding culminated in In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), which held that it was § 101 subject matter to claim as an
apparatus a programmed computer, because once programmed a computer was indeed a special
purpose machine. State Street was then followed by AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d
1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), which endorsed method claiming for software.
52. State St., 49 F.3d at 1375.
53. Id. at 1375.
54. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE: REVISION 1 § 706.03(a) (7th ed. 2000)
[hereinafter MPEP]. See Roberta J. Morris, Some Data About Patents in Class 705, INTELL.
PROP. TODAY, May 2001, at 51.
55. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, at http://www.uspto.gov (last visited May 29,
2001).
56. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix
Corp, 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992), In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re
Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994); AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352
(Fed. Cir. 1999). See also In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d
758 (C.C.P.A 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A 1982).
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business methods was sharp and strong. Applicants rushed to the USPTO to
file for business method patents, particularly in Class 705. The stampede may
prove to be of questionable consequentiality in terms of issued patents,
especially since many of those applications were destined to be filed anyway,
given the advent of the Internet.57 However the fact that State Street Bank
initiated a “race to the Patent Office” with technologies complex (Signature
Financial’s “Hub and Spoke” Mutual Fund Reconciling Program)58 and simple
(Amazon’s “One Click” patents)59 is borne out by USPTO statistics. Class 705
applications rose from 330 in 1995 to 7,800 in 2000.60
These applications are considered by many to be for technology applying
well developed programming techniques that were, to a greater or lesser extent,
already known or in use. For a brief and anomalous period, in this limited
area, the U.S. may fairly be considered to have a de-facto first to file system.
In spite of the fact that a rule against patenting Business Methods never
really existed, public debate over the State Street Bank holding has been
contentious. Congress, however, took note of this fact. Fallout from State
Street Bank proved to be a catalyst for passage of Prior User Rights and it also
proved to be a successful, if unfinished, ground work for compromise between
Prior User Rights’ advocates and opponents.
The framework of the previous Prior User Rights bill was modified to
become the “first to invent defense” of the American Inventor’s Protection
Act. To pass over the objections of opponents, the right was limited to
Surviving from the original legislation are the
Business Methods.61
commercial use requirement and a form of the Section 156 regulatory review
qualification62 and the personal defense limitation.63 Lost to Prior User Rights
advocates was the broad definition of methods as Section 100(b) processes.64
In its stead, the present definition passed. The current law has the architecture
and the legislative history to support either a broad or narrow definition of “a
method of doing or conducting business.”

57. See Morris, supra note 55.
58. U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (issued Mar. 9, 1993).
59. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 9, 1999).
60. Class 705 applications filed: 330 in 1995; 584 in 1996; 927 in 1997; 1,340 in 1998;
2,821 in 1999; and 7,800 in 2000. Class 705 patents issued: 126 in 1995; 144 in 1996; 206 in
1997; 420 in 1998; 585 in 1999; and 899 in 2000. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, supra
note 56.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 144 - 156, for a discussion on legislative history.
62. Formerly included as a part of “effective and serious preparation” for commercialization.
See H.R. 4978, 102nd Cong. (1992); S. 2605, 102nd Cong. § 273 (1992).
63. See H.R. 4978, 102nd Cong. (1992); S. 2605, 102nd Cong. § 273 (1992).
64. See H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999). “The term ‘process or method’ means ‘process’ as
defined in [35 U.S.C.] § 100(b), and includes any invention that produces a useful end product or
service which has been or could have been claimed in a patent in the form of a process.” Id.
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Statutory Construction—The Argument For Broad Application Of The
New Defense

Prior User Rights advocates argue that basic tenants of statutory
construction indicate that a broad reading of “method of doing or conducting
business” is correct.65 First, the language of the statute itself controls,
particularly when read in context and in view of companion statutory
provisions,66 and legislative history is to be examined only in situations of
unresolvable ambiguity.67 Accordingly, advocates argue that the definition of
“methods” must be Section 100(b) processes, because of the existence in the
act of the Section 156 allowance that technology under regulatory review may
qualify as being in commercial use to claim the benefit of the defense. Since
such reviews, as by the FDA, are far broader in scope than any conceivable
review of Internet or financial technology, the AIPA is properly construed as
equally broad in scope. Second, advocates argue that the defense is site
specific and that such a limitation is a fiction for Internet technology.
Therefore, the AIPA is properly construed in a broad sense, since “site” is
properly construed as applying to physical plants, where manufacturing
processes occur. Finally, Prior User Rights advocates argue that the Act’s
definition includes methods of “doing or conducting business.” The presence
of two words is properly construed as meaning two types of methods are
intended to be covered; “doing” business methods and “conducting”
manufacturing processes.
These arguments may support a broad reading of the AIPA, but they do not
compel it. While an application of the regulatory qualification clause of the
AIPA supports a broad interpretation, ignoring it does not vitiate a narrow
reading. Finally, of course, the clause is a modification from the broader
unrestricted draft of the Harmonization Act,68 which did not pass into law until
the State Street Bank compromise in 1999.69
The site specific limitation may be fairly construed as a Unique Resource
Locator (URL). If the nature and extent of a website’s content and
functionality are considered to be evanescent, it need only be recalled that the
burden of proving what functionality existed at an accused website at a given
time is on the defendant operator of that site, if they intend to use the prior user

65. The author wishes to acknowledge the generous contributions of Gary Griswold and
Kent Kokko for sharing Power Point slides and conversations, notwithstanding the positions
taken in this article.
66. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
67. United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
68. H.R. 4978, 102nd Cong. (1992); S. 2605, 102nd Cong. (1992).
69. The Courts may consider the circumstances surrounding passage of legislation. See Leo
Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669 (1979).
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defense.70 This is no less problematic than the dissection of often
heterogeneous physical plants to determine if inter-operable processing across
the hall, across the street, or across town will qualify as a single “site.” Most
compelling is the fact that “site” must be construed to mean a website
(preferably, a URL) if Internet business method patents are to be covered by
the Act, which is the subject matter all sides agree the Act was meant to cover.
Finally, the words “doing or conducting” are not further defined or used in
the AIPA and so their dual presence does not mandate that a separate or broad
meaning be given to either or both of them. The language of the statute itself,
then, does not compel a necessarily broad definition of Business Methods any
more than it compels a narrow reading. Accordingly, even under the
traditional statutory construction rules, the language of the statute is more than
ambiguous enough for the courts to consider the legislative history as an
extrinsic interpretation aide.71
C. Legislative History
Both the advocates and opponents of Prior User Rights made a record in
the legislative history that the statue will bear their interpretation of it, either
narrow or broad. In the Committee Reports, hearings, sponsor statements,
history of legislative inaction and circumstances surrounding the introduction
and passage of the bill, support can be found for both the broad and a narrow
interpretation of the meaning of “methods of doing or conducting business.”
While disparate language appears, when taken as a whole the legislative
history clearly shows a consensus that the new defense be available to
substantive, Class 705 type, Business Methods. There is no such consensus
that the new defense apply more broadly than that.
D. Committee Reports
Statements in Committee Reports are generally considered authoritative
and are given great weight.72 The Committee Report from the House begins:
Title II strikes an equitable balance between the interest of U.S. inventors who
have invented and commercialized business methods and processes, many of
which until recently were not patentable, and later U.S. or foreign inventors
who have patented the processes . . .

70. AIPA, § 4302, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(4) (1999).
71. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
72. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1982) (estimating that
over 60% of the Supreme Courts cites to legislative history over a forty year period were to
Committee Reports); but see Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting)
(noting the effect that particular constituencies make statements advocating their positions in
Committee Reports, whose details are seldom seen by all the House members enacting the bill).
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The title clarifies the interface between two key branches of intellectual
property law—patents and trade secrets. Patent law serves the public interest
by encouraging innovation and investment in new technology, and may be
thought of as providing a right to exclude other parties from an invention in
return for the inventor making a public disclosure of the invention. Trade
secret law, however, also serves the public interest by protecting investments
in new technology. Trade secrets have taken on a new importance with an
increase in the ability to patent all business methods and processes. It would
be administratively and economically impossible to expect any inventor to
apply for a patent on all business methods and processes now deemed
patentable. In order to protect inventors and to encourage proper disclosure,
this title is limited to business methods and processes only.73

Interestingly, while the above quoted language from the Committee report
remained intact, the House version of the Bill included the broad definition of
methods retained from the earlier Harmonization Act. “(3) process or method
means processes as defined in Section 100(b) of the Patent Act and includes
inventions that were or could have been in a patent in the form of a
process . . . ”74
i.

Broad View

Broad interpretation advocates point to the following language from the
report to support their position:
Subsection (b)(3) creates limitations and qualifications on the use of the
defense. First, a person may not assert the defense unless the invention for
which the defense is asserted is for a business process or method, the exclusive
purpose of which is to produce a useful end product or service; that is, the
defense will not be available if the subject matter itself is a useful end product
or service that constitutes one or more claims of the patent . . . .
[T]he right to assert the defense can not be licensed, assigned or transferred . . .
. . .to illustrate, a person is lawfully entitled to assert the defense as it relates to
the operation of a specific piece of machinery. The person owns several other
pieces of machinery that perform distinct functions which, taken together
comprise the person’s business. That person may not transfer the defense as it
relates to the specific piece of machinery to a third party unless the entire
commercial establishment is transferred as well.75

The distinction from end products and the references to machinery support
broad interpretation of methods as including manufacturing methods.
The report, however, also contains limiting language. In addition to that
found in the introductory remarks quoted above, the report also says:

73. H.R. REP NO. 106-287, at 44-45 (1999).
74. H.1907, 106th Cong. (1999) (original draft).
75. H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, at 48-49 (1999).
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An invention is considered to be a process or method if it is used in connection
with the production of a useful end product or service and is or could have
been claimed in the form of a business process or a method in a patent. A
software related invention, for example that was claimed by the patent
draftsman as a programmed machine when the same invention could have been
protected with process or method patent claims is a process or method for
purposes of Section 273.76

This statement that substance will prevail over the claiming form means
that “methods of doing or conducting business” must be a subject matter
definition, i.e. Class 705 Business Methods, and not a patent claim form
definition. If this were not so, this clause would mean that almost all claims to
all apparatuses, which almost always include method claims,77 would be
covered by the Prior User Right, whether a “business” method or otherwise.
This, of course, is the Prior User Rights advocates’ intended result, but is not
what opponents agreed to in passing the bill.
ii. Limited View
Other language in the Committee Report supporting a limited
interpretation of the definition includes:
Accordingly, “arms length commercial transfer of a product or service” under
proposed Section 273 includes the use of an invention for a process or method,
the subject matter of which may be directed to an information or data
processing system providing a financial service. These financial services may
embody business methods or processes incorporated into any number of
systems including, but not limited to, trading, investment and liquidity
management, securities, custody and reporting, balance reporting, funds
transfer, ACH, ATM process, on-line banking, check processing, and
compliance in risk management. In each of these systems, multiple processing
and methods steps are acting upon a customer’s data without its knowledge.78

This description of what is commonly and historically understood to be the
core of Business Method Patenting is immediately followed by a Committee
Report endorsement of the historical context in which this act was passed:
In the past, many of the financial institutions that developed and used such
systems did so in a climate where trade secret protection was believed to be the
only practical legal protection available. Under established law, these preexisting systems do not now qualify for patent protection because they have
been in commercial use for some time, albeit in secret. Such secret or
“concealed” use may not prevent another, later inventor from obtaining patent
76. Id. at 46.
77. It is common among practitioners to draft claims “covering” an invention in all forms
possible. See generally FABER LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (Pat. L.
Inst. ed., 4th ed. 1998).
78. H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, at 47 (1999).
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protection that would bar the earlier developer and user from continuing to use
the business processes and methods that are her earlier inventions and that may
have been in use for years or even decades.79

This narrative is a clear reference to the 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) limitation that prior
art that has been “abandoned, suppressed or concealed” by its owner may not
serve to invalidate a patent later issued to a second comer to the technology.
E.

Hearings And Floor Debates

Statements in hearing and floor debates receive less deference than do
Committee reports.
Witnesses and Congressmen frequently use such
opportunities to advocate positions opposed to one another or even opposed to
the draft legislation. Moreover, statements in debate may be amended or
supplemented in the published version of the Congressional Record after
legislators have voted.80 Nevertheless, the Courts are entitled to consider such
testimony.81The advocates of a broad reading of “methods of doing or
conducting business” use the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property Hearings, presided over by Representative
Coble, to make their case.
i.

Broad View

Michael K. Kirk, executive director of the American Intellectual Property
Law Association, in endorsing the Prior User Rights section of the bill made
arguments that also support a broad interpretation of “methods of doing or
conducting business” to include manufacturing processes:
There are a number of reasons why it is not feasible or even possible to patent
every invention which could be patented. First and foremost are costs. The
costs of seeking and obtaining patent protection in the United States are high.
These costs, as well as the costs of enforcing patents in this country, have
become so high that U.S. companies, regardless of size, must carefully
prioritize which inventions they seek to patent. These costs fall even more
heavily on smaller U.S. firms, and especially on independent inventorinnovators, who are frequently limited to patenting only their most important
inventions.82
Industrial process technology presents another difficult dilemma for its
creators. Identifying a competitor’s use of a patented process can be extremely

79. Id.
80. See Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (1983).
81. NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
48.13 (4th ed. 1984).
82. It is argued by more than a few that Prior User Rights benefit large corporations far more
than individuals. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 39, at 213 (statement of Gabrial P. Katona).
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difficult in the United States and virtually impossible in foreign countries.
Even if obtaining patents in the United States and abroad were economically
feasible, the patent’s disclosure of the process presents a significant risk to the
patentee in the United States and foreign markets. Especially in the case of
products made abroad and imported into the United States, it is very difficult to
prove that the products were made by a particular process that infringes a
patent in the United States or the country of origin.
For these and other practical reasons, many U.S. companies and especially
smaller U.S. companies are forced to forego patenting of many inventions. In
the case of Industrial Process Technology and certain manufacturing
equipment, these companies seek to protect their technology under trade secret
laws. Because patents may not completely protect such technology, and
because infringement by others which occurs within the confines of their own
factories is virtually undetectable, disclosing such technology through patents
is not the best way to protect it. Practicing the technology in secret is more
effective. This creates the possibility that a second, later U.S. or foreign
inventor may obtain a U.S. patent on technology already being commercially
used, but which has not been publicly disclosed. This later inventing U.S. or
foreign holder of a U.S. patent could then obtain an injunction and prevent the
U.S. manufacture from further use of the invention, even though the U.S.
manufacturer has the made the benefits of the invention available to the public
through its commercial trade secret use of the invention.83

Although not in the legislative history, the AIPLA has made its position clear
in a White Paper:
The AIPLA recommends that the first inventor defense be applied to all
commercialized methods without regard to the technologies in which they are
implemented or to the formats in which they are claimed. To the extent that
this is not clear from the language of the statute and the legislative history, the
statute should be revised.84

At the Committee hearings Norman Balmer, president of the Intellectual
Property Owners, stated:
The first to invent defense in the Committee print preserves trade secrets that
are the life blood of American manufacturing and service companies. . . .
It can take years and millions of dollars to engineer and construct a
manufacturing plant using new technology or producing a new product. . . .
Inventions such as manufacturing processes often can be protected most
effectively against copying by U.S. competitors by keeping them as trade
83. Id. at 104.
84. Patenting Business Methods: A White Paper of the American Intellectual Property Law
Association, adopted Nov. 27, 2000 (citing AIPLA Motion in Support of S.2272 (July 14, 1994)),
available at http://www.aipla.org/html/whatsnew/patentingbusiness2.pdf (last visited June 20,
2001).
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secrets instead of obtaining a U.S. patent. Moreover, U.S. patents can be a
blueprint for foreign competitors to steal technology.85

Interestingly, both Kirk and Balmer backed up their statements by arguing the
impact of State Street:
This decision will have significant ramifications. By December 1998 the
Patent and Trademark Office reported a 40% increase in patent applications for
business method software. Firms in the financial industry that developed and
commercially used business methods in secret before 1998 are foreclosed from
obtaining their own patents because of their own prior commercial use
(35 U.S.C. § 102(b)). Yet, later developers of the same methods can now
obtain a U.S. patent. [The first inventor defense] will make more certain the
validity of newly filed “business method” patents while allowing prior
inventors the ability to continue serving the public interest in their business.
In summary, the first to invent defense is essential to protect and encourage
business investments and manufacturing its services and prevent a costly give
away of American know-how to foreign competitors through patent inventions
that are better protected by secrecy.86

Kirk stated:
This [State Street] decision put to rest the notion that “methods of doing
business” were not patentable subject matter. Thus, many businesses that
eschewed seeking patents for similar subject matter may now find that the
techniques they have used as trade secrets in their daily operations are being
patented by others, putting them in considerable risk.87

Thus, although these advocates of the Bill are also advocates of a broad
interpretation of it and had been advocates of across the board Prior User
Rights in earlier draft legislation, they argued their points by making
statements regarding the State Street Bank decision that are consistent with a
narrow interpretation of the definition of “methods of doing or conducting
business,” although that was clearly not the intent of these witnesses at the
hearings.
There is good reason for the testimony of Balmer and Kirk not more
directly addressing the issue of the breadth of the definition of “methods of
doing or conducting business.” The draft of the Bill at the time of their
testimony still defined methods as Section 100(B) processes. It was only after
the March 26, 1999 hearing that the draft was amended to limit the defense to
“methods of doing or conducting business.” Representative Rohrabacher, in a
May 5, 1999 fact sheet, said that “[t]he rationale for the more narrowly tailored
defense is to address the precedent set forth by State Street Bank. That case

85. Hearings, supra note 39, at 86.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 106.
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gave patent protection to data processing systems and eliminated the business
method exception to patentability.”88
At the end of the hearing a letter from the National Association of
Manufacturers written on April 5, 1999 was read into the record. The letter
argued that the Prior User Rights would not decrease the disclosure of
technology which the patent laws seek to incentivize, because “this statutory
defense could only come into play after one party had been granted a patent,
with its intended public disclosure.”89 This of course does not take into
account that the patent laws are designed to incentivize the original inventor to
disclose his technology.90
The letter goes on to make the more persuasive argument that under the
current system the result of litigation between a second comer/patentee and a
first inventor/trade secret user of the technology is harsh: a “death sentence”
for either the trade secret or the patent, referring to Section 102(g).91
ii. Limited View
Even before Congressman Rohrabacher’s comments, the Committee
Hearings contained statements consistent with the narrow construction of Prior
User Rights. In questioning the passage of a Prior User Rights bill at all,
Representative Tom Campbell from California stated:
I have checked with as many high tech companies as I can . . . [they] said that
this undermines the whole idea of encouraging people to file for a patent….
The rebuttal is very strong. The rebuttal says, for heaven sake. That is what
you get for not patenting it. The idea here is to get people to patent so that it is
not secret. If you allow an exception, which your bill does in title II for a prior
commercial use, I think it undermines that incentive in an important way.92

This invocation of disclosure encouragement as the time honored way to
achieve the constitutional mandate of “promoting the progress of the useful
arts”93 is further developed in the comments of Representative Rohrabacher
from California:
As I have always held, due to the constitutional issues and Supreme Court
precedent, we simply cannot champion trade secret protection over patent
protection for clearly patentable subject matter. We cannot betray our
founding fathers by abandoning the foundation upon which our patent system

88. BNA’S PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., May 27, 1999, at 101.
89. Hearings, supra note 39, at 222.
90. Id. Of course this raises a useful topic for quantitative study: Are more patent
applications filed, and disclosures made, if a series of “inventors” are given the opportunity for a
valid patent, instead of just the first?
91. Id. at 225.
92. Id. at 14.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
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is based. We cannot allow state based rights to trump long standing federally
created intellectual property rights. We cannot openly advocate secrecy when
our patent system calls for us to vigorously promote the progress of science
through the sharing of critical technology information.
With that said, however, all is not lost. Perhaps there is a way in the context of
an overall agreement that I could support a narrow application of a first to
invent defense.94

Representative Rohrabacher then went on to endorse the Bill’s limitations on
the availability of the defense, without specifically addressing the definition of
methods of doing business.
F.

House Floor Debate

Hence, all partisans both in favor of and opposed to a broad application of
Prior User Rights made statements at the House Committee Hearings that
would support both narrow and broad definitions of methods of doing or
conducting business. The most accurate and candid summation of the
legislative history in the House was made by the subcommittee chairman,
Congressman Coble, in response to a question from Congressman Lofgren
from California about the extent of the impact of the Bill:
Mr. Speaker, it is limited, I say to the gentlewoman from California, to the
State Street Bank case. There was some discussion early on that perhaps the
first inventor defense should apply to processes as well as methods. But we
finally concluded that we would restrict it to methods only, and that, by having
done that, we were able to satisfy some folks who were opposed to the Bill
otherwise.95

On August 3, 1999, Representative Rohrabacher went on to say:
Instead of a prior user defense that applies to all inventions . . . HR 1907
contains a very limited prior user defense that applies only to those business
methods which have only been considered patentable in the last few years, and
this, of course, flows from an adverse case before the Court that changed the
patent law.96

On August 4, 1999, HR 1907 passed the House by a 376 to 43 vote. After the
amendment, comments on the breadth of the “methods” to which the defense
would apply became even more pointedly divisive.

94. Hearings, supra note 39, at 22.
95. 145 CONG. REC. H6942 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Cobble), reprinted in
BNA’S PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Aug. 5, 1999, at 425. According to Senator Hatch’s
Introductory Remarks, “[t]his legislation is the product of several years of discussion and
extensive efforts to reach agreement on a responsible package of patent reforms.” Id.
96. 145 CONG. REC. H6943 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher).
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Broad View

Some of the Senate’s section by section analysis of S. 1948 indicates the
defense is not limited to the facts of the State Street Bank case:
To be “commercially used” or in “commercial use” for purposes of Subsection
A, the use must be in connection with either an internal commercial use or an
actual arms length sale or other arms length commercial transfer of a useful
end result. The method that is the subject matter of the defense may be an
internal method for doing business, such as an internal human resources
management process, or a method for conducting business such as a
preliminary or intermediate manufacturing procedure, which contributes to
the effectiveness of the business by producing a useful end result for the
internal operation of the business or for external sale. Commercial use does
not require the subject matter at issue to be accessible to or otherwise known to
the public.97

On November 19, Senator Charles Schumer said, “[t]he defense will be
applicable against method claims as claims involving machines or other
articles the manufacturer used to practice such methods.”98Furthermore,
Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York stated that, “[t]he first inventor
defense is intended to protect both method claims and apparatus claims.”99
ii. Narrow View
In his remarks introducing the Bill in the Senate, Senator Hatch said:
The Bill responds to recent changes in PTO practice and the Federal Circuit’s
1998 decision in State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, 149 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998), in which it formally did away with the
so called “business methods” exception to statutory patentable subject matter.
As a result, patent filings for business methods are up by 75% this year, and
many who have been using business methods for many years pursuant to trade
secret protection—believing such methods were not patentable—are now faced
with potential patent infringement suits from others who, while they may have
come later to the game, were the first to reach the Patent Office after the bar to
patentability for business methods was lifted.100

The legislative history makes it clear that there is a consensus that the prior
user defense applies to substantive business methods such as those typified by
Class 705 and State Street. No such consensus exists for broader application
of the defense.

97. 145 CONG REC. S1471 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999) (emphasis added), reprinted in BNA’S
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Nov. 25, 1999, at 189-90.
98. 145 CONG. REC. S6942 (daily ed. Nov. 11, 1999) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
99. 145 CONG. REC. H12805 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
100. 145 CONG. REC. S13259 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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G. Substance Over Form
Probably the most useful quote from the legislative history is from
Chairman Coble:
The issue of whether an invention is a method is to be determined based on its
underlying nature and not on the technicality of the form of the claims in the
patent. For example, a method for doing or conducting business that has been
claimed in a patent as a programmed machine, as in the State Street case, is a
method for purposes of Section 273 if the invention could have as easily been
claimed as a method. Form should not rule over substance.101

This statement is in accord with the case law. In the long struggle over
software patentability that ultimately lifted the bar on Business Method
patenting as well, distinctions between method claims and machine claims
were discounted in the final analysis. In AT&T v. Excel Communications the
court held, “[w]e consider the scope of Section 101 to be the same regardless
of the form—machine or process—in which a particular claim is drafted.”102
In In Re Allappat, Judge Rader, in his concurring opinion, writes, “Judge Rich,
with whom I fully concur, reads Allappat’s application as claiming a machine.
In fact, whether the invention is a process or a machine is irrelevant.”103 In
State Street Bank the court held, “for the purposes of a Section 101 analysis, it
is of little relevance whether claim 1 is directed to a machine or
process . . . . . . .”104 The AT&T court concluded that:
[T]he Supreme Court’s decisions in Diehr, Benson, and Flook, all of which
involve method (i.e. process) claims, have provided and supported the
principles which we apply to both machine and process type claims. Thus, we
are comfortable in applying our reasoning in Allappat and State Street to the
method claims at issue in this case.105

This refusal to consider an artificial and problematic distinction in Section
101 analysis should be, as Congressman Coble indicated, applied to prior use
analysis. This will avoid tortuous claim drafting by practitioners attempting to
avoid or invoke the two different sets of rights that the recent legislation has
created. Rejecting such an artificial distinction will also avoid the prospect of
putting defendants in the position of arguing that their technology is the same
as plaintiff patentee’s technology for purposes of invoking the defense on the
method claims, while simultaneously arguing that the machine which performs
the method is different than the plaintiff’s technology to avoid infringing the
apparatus claims.
101. 145 CONG. REC. H6942 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. Coble). See also
Senate section by section analysis of S.1948.
102. AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1450.
103. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1581.
104. State St., 149 F.3d at 1372.
105. AT&T, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1451.
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Since the law, the legislature and logic all dictate that substance shall
control over claim drafting form, it can be seen that the original draft definition
of “methods” as Section 100(b) processes would, in practical application,
affect across the board Prior User Rights for all technology, exclusive only of
articles of manufacture and compositions of matter. This may be what Prior
User Rights advocates intended. It may also be what ultimately happens with
this statute. If the legislature does not again intervene to define the scope of
Prior User Rights, this statute may later be interpreted by the courts, just as
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was later interpreted by the courts to be broad
in scope.106 The following question remains: Does the tautological definition
of business methods passed into law also represent the germination of an
exception that could swallow the rule?
IV. TOWARDS A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION
Broadly applied, Prior User Rights represent a fundamental change in the
architecture of the United States patent system. Prior scholarly and legislative
debate has been closely contested.107 Accordingly, this subject deserves
plenary consideration and debate in the legislature, as opposed to the eleventh
hour compromise that produced the ambiguous “first inventor defense.”108
Limited legislation has already been introduced suggesting a sharper
definition of “Business Methods” as:
1.

2.
3.

a method of—(a) administering, managing, or otherwise operating an
enterprise or organization, including a technique used in doing or
conducting business; or (b) processing financial data;
any technique used in athletics, instruction, or personal skills; and
any computer-assisted implementation of a method described in
paragraph 1 or a technique described in paragraph 2.109

106. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), Lanham Act § 43(a). The scope of the ban on false advertising
took decades to reach its full breadth as courts and practitioners expanded it. See DONALD
CHISUM, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, Section 6E[1].
107. See Harmonization Act Hearings, supra note 43; see also Harriel, supra note 1;
Brownlee, supra note 1; Frank Robbins & Karl Jorda, The Rights of the First Inventor – Trade
Secret User as Against Those of the Second Inventor-Patentee, 61 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 575 (1979);
Robert L. Rohyback, Prior User Rights: Roses or Thorns?, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1
(1993); Griswold, supra note 2, at 233; Griswold & Ubel, supra note 2, at 567: .
108. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the relative merits of the debate over
broadly applied prior user rights. Rather, this article is directed towards anticipating an
appropriate and workable definition of the methods to which the first inventor defense of the
American Inventors Protection Act should apply.
109. Business Method Patent Improvement Act, H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. (2001); see also
Further Hearings of Business Method Patents Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Prop., 2001 WL 333922 (F.D.C.H.).
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Short of legislation breaking the decade old stalemate over prior user rights,
efforts will need to be directed towards defining the scope of the current
defense. It will be helpful to consider information from the following sources
to discern the public policies articulated on the subject of prior trade secret use:
the USPTO classification system, the history of the “Business Method” case
law, and the case law interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). It will be seen that those
policies promote disclosure of technology and, separately, promote to the
extent possible, certainty and predictability of the patent system for those who
develop technology and invest in it. Finally, the nature of current patents on
Business Methods will be considered in light of those policies.
A.

The USPTO Classification System

The first step in determining whether or not an asserted patent is subject to
Prior User Rights or not will be to determine whether or not the patent in
question is classified as a Business Method. This section will briefly review
how the USPTO classifies patent applications.
The USPTO has authority to maintain the classification of patents by
subject matter.110 Classification has heretofore been directed towards
administrative purposes and maintaining a database of patents that may be
efficiently searched. Under the new AIPA, exercise of that authority will
generate classifications that will be presumptively valid and subject to review
as a matter of law. Hence, although not entitled to interpret the law, the
USPTO may elect to take the initiative of enumerating those classes considered
to be Business Methods to which the defense would apply, thereby giving
some limited guidance to applicants and potential applicants. Indeed, that
guidance would be mandated under the proposed Business Method Patent
Improvement Act.111
Generally, patents are classified principally in terms of their utility. The
focus is upon the function, effect or product of a process or apparatus. The
primary criterion is the most comprehensive claim; that is, the most narrow,
independent claim.112 If two or more claims are comprehensive enough for
original classification, as for example an apparatus claim and a method claim,
selection between them is next based on priority of statutory category of
invention. The patent is placed in the class providing for the claimed category
that appears highest in the following list:

110. 35 U.S.C. § 8 (1999).
111. H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. § 321(b)(1)(B) (2000).
112. See EXAMINER’S HANDBOOK TO THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, Chapter
IV, Determination of Class for Original Classification. U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, Development
and Use of Patent Classification Sys., Lib. Of Cong. Catalog No. 65-62235, at viii (1996).
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Process (of using product 2, e.g., using a fuel or radio transmitter)
Product (of manufacture, e.g., a fuel or radio transmitter)
Process (of making product 2)
Apparatus (to perform 3 or to make 2, e.g., machine, tool, etc.)
Materials (used in 3 to make 2)

If selection is still not clear, placement is next determined by considering the
highest category below that provides for claimed subject matter:
1. Relating to maintenance or preservation of life
2. Chemical subject matter
3. Electrical subject matter
4. Mechanical subject matter
a. Dynamic (relates to moving things or combinations of relatively
moving parts)
b. Static (stationary things or parts nonmoveably related)113
Classification criteria are directed towards the “proximate” effect on a
process.114 The proximate effect is the immediate output of a process, as
opposed to the overall output of the process as it may be applied to various
industries. For example, a process may proximately cause pasteurization and
would be classified as such, as opposed to being classified as a process for
producing milk or beer.
Claims are taken as they are read, in light of the disclosure. “Any attempt
of a post classifier to go behind the record and decide the case upon what is
deemed to be the “real invention” would, it is believed, introduce more errors
than such action would cure.”115 When the application is received by the
USPTO, it is routed through the office of Initial Patent Examination where an
initial classification decision is made by classifiers who are not experts in any
particular field.116 Thereafter, it is the duty of the examiner117 to review the
classification propriety, and also the supervisory patent examiner to review
proper classification. Transfer procedures for reclassification through a “post
classifier” are spelled out at MPEP Section 903.08(d). The patent may be
reclassified at allowance.118

113. Id. See also MPEP, supra note 55, at § 903.07.
114. EXAMINER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at Chapter I.
115. MPEP, supra note 55, at § 908.08(e)(3).
116. Id. §903.08(a).
117. Id. § 903.07.
118. Id. Although proper classification is assumed, it is also a valid premise that practitioners
will have the acumen and motivation to style and manipulate applications either within or without
a classification that may invoke prior user rights. For an example of this kind of artful drafting,
see U.S. Patent No. 4,346,442 (issued Oct. 10, 1980) to Musmanno for a “securities brokeragecash management system.” This patent on a software implemental business method was issued in

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

PRIOR USER RIGHTS FOR BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

269

The USPTO Manual of U.S. Patent Classification defines Class 705 as
“data processing: financial, business practice, management or cost/price
determination.”119 The Class currently lists about one hundred subclasses,
from scheduling to postage metering.120 About thirty related classes are listed
thereunder as suggested areas for an examiner to search for prior art. These
other classes, for example time measurement, control systems or electrical
computers for calculating, may also come to be reasonably understood as
encompassing “methods of doing or conducting business.”121
B.

The History Of The Business Method Exception

The genesis of the “new” business patent rule is in the line of cases
establishing the patentability of software. This line of cases demonstrates the
importance of software implementation in execution of business methods.
In 1994 the Federal Circuit criticized earlier rulings that software’s
mathematical algorithms were not patentable subject matter, because
arithmetic is a subset of the “natural laws” exception to patentability. In re
Allappat held that a general purpose computer when programmed by software
became a special purpose computer which qualified as a machine and brought
it within the scope of the subject matter encompassed by 35 U.S.C. § 101. In
order to do so, the court’s opinion rewrote the method claims of the rejected
Allappat patent application into apparatus claims. The court ruled that a
computing machine that produced a practical, tangible and useful
transformation of data was a machine that could properly be patented under
Section 101, provided it was also new under Section 102, non-obvious under
Section 103 and properly disclosed under § 112.
The USPTO had always resisted patenting of pure software. Traditional
industrial applications incorporating computer technology were issued patents
pursuant to Diamond v. Diehr.122 In 1996 the USPTO finally capitulated and
issued its guidelines for patenting of computer-related inventions.123 They also
eliminated from the MPEP the language in Section 706.03(a) indicating that
“Business Methods” were not a statutory category for patentability.
Nevertheless, patent validity for software executing pure transformations of
data was contested by litigants based not only upon its nature as a pure
“mathematical algorithm” but also on the basis that it was unpatentable as a
business method.
1982, long before either software or business methods per se were deemed to be patentable
subject matter by the Courts or USPTO.
119. See supra note 6.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 450 U.S. 175 (1980) (a rubber mold). See also Arrythmia v. Corazonix, 958 F.2d 1053
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (a medical diagnostic instrument).
123. 61 Fed. Reg. 7478-92 (1996).
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The idea that Business Methods were excluded from patentability under
Section 101 was a rule more honored in its avoidance than its application. The
exception originated in Hotel Security Checking, Co. vs. Lorraine, Co. The
court stated that a “system of transacting business, apart from means for
carrying it out, is not within the purview of [patent protection] . . . nor is an
abstract idea or theory, regardless of its importance, apart from means for
carrying such ideas or theories into effect, patentable subject matter.” The
Business Method there in question was a system of creating accounts for hotel
employees and waiters to suppress pilferage. The accounts were debited for
meals taken and credited for payment for those meals. The “rule” against
patentability of Business Methods, however, was mere dicta. The court based
its holding on the fact that such a business method was not novel.
In the following cases, the Business Method “exception” was deliberately
not addressed in favor of holdings based upon novelty and non-obviousness: In
re Wait,124 Application of Howard,125 Dann v. Johnson,126 and Paine Webber v.
Merrill Lynch.127 Additionally, academic review has failed to find a holding
squarely based upon a “business method exception” to statutory
patentability.128
i.

The State Street Decision

In State Street Bank the Federal Circuit considered the validity of a patent
covering a computer system for controlling financial operations. The softwareimplemented business method in question was a partnership of mutual funds
created for tax benefits and administrative efficiencies. An investment was
made in developing software that could accurately and promptly calculate
share prices to each shareholder in each of the participating funds after
calculating each day’s fluctuations in share price, number of shares sold,
number of shares bought and shareholders entering and leaving funds. This
“hub and spoke” method of properly transforming the relevant data was
challenged in district court as being outside of statutory subject matter because
it was a mathematical algorithm and also because it was a business method.
Patent owner Signature Financial had originally filed twelve claims, six
apparatus claims and six method claims. It withdrew the method claims under
the examiner’s threat of Section 101 subject matter rejection of them. In
construing the six apparatus claims, the district court read them as actually
124. 73 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A 1934)
125. 394 F.2d 869 (C.C.P.A 1968),
126. 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (holding that a computer automated check record keeping system
was invalid because it was obvious in light of the prior art, not because it was excepted as a
business method).
127. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (Del. 1983).
128. See Rinaldo del Gallo, Are Methods of Doing Business Finally Out of Business As a
Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403 (1998).
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being directed to a process. Since the Alappat case had only authorized
apparatus claims as statutory subject matter, the district court held the redrawn
“method” claims invalid as not being drawn to statutory subject matter, both in
its capacity as a mathematical algorithm process and as a business method.
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the claims were properly drawn
as apparatus claims and reading in the requisite data structures from the
specification under Section 112(6). The State Street Bank court stated in dicta
that, for purposes of Section 101 analysis, “it is of little relevance whether
claim 1 is directed to a ‘machine’ or a ‘process.’”129 It held that the hub and
spoke software was statutory subject matter because it produced a “useful,
concrete and tangible result.” The Court stated:
We hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts,
by a machine through a series of a mathematical calculations into a final share
price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula,
or calculation, because it produces a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result’ – a
final share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and
even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent
trades.130

Finally, the Federal Circuit considered the Business Method exception as
grounds for holding the patent invalid as non-statutory subject matter. It
stated, “we take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest.”131
The Court reviewed the history of the relevant case law, as above, and
concluded that the exception had never actually been invoked by the Court.
The Court’s holding is rightfully understood to authorize patent protection
for computer implemented business applications, including not only software
but electronic commerce. According to the court, the patent claim in question
was “. . .directed to a machine programmed with the hub and spoke software
which admittedly produces a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result.’ This
renders it statutory subject matter, even if the useful result is expressed in
numbers, such as a price, profit, percentage, cost or loss.”132
ii. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.
On April 14, 1999 the Federal Circuit ruled in AT&T Corp. vs. Excel
Communications, Inc.133 Although validity was not challenged as a business
method, but as a mathematical algorithm, the court emphatically reaffirmed the
holding in State Street Bank. It also expanded the principles stated in State
Street Bank, holding that the form of the claim, as a method or apparatus, does

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

State St., 149 F.3d at 1375 (emphasis added).
State St., 149 F.3d at 1375.
Id.
Id.
172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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not matter. “Whether stated implicitly or explicitly, we consider the scope of
Section 101 to be the same regardless of the form—machine or process—in
which a particular claim is drafted.”134
The court also put to rest the “physical transformation” test, another
remnant of the court’s quarter century long struggle with software patent
validity under Section 101. No physical transformation is required; a
transformation of data is adequate. The court stated, “. . .the mere fact that a
claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting
numbers and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory
subject matter, unless, of course, its operation does not produce a useful,
concrete and tangible result.”135
Even more important than the court’s clear holding is the substance of the
matter ruled upon. The patent involved the administration of discounts that
long distance telephone carriers offered when both the caller and the recipient
of the call are customers of the same long-distance company. Each long
distance call travels with a data packet which, when displayed, has a number of
data fields including the identity of the caller, the identity of the person called
and the length of the call. This “message record” is a useful place to display
whether or not the caller and recipient qualify for a discount by subscribing to
the same long distance carrier. Accordingly, AT&T’s method patent was to
first, generate this message record as to whether or not both parties to the call
subscribe to the same long distance carrier and second, display that in the
record. The patent was declared valid, summary judgment was reversed and
AT&T allowed to pursue its damages, including lost profits and injunction,
against its telecommunications competitor, Excel, based on a simple two-step
method claim.136 Interestingly, the AT&T patent is classed under
telecommunications, not Business Methods.137

134. Id. at 1374.
135. Id.
136. A separate controversial subject is the validity of the patents that are being issued by the
USPTO currently. The director of technology examiners group 2700, responsible for data
processing applications, readily admits that he is understaffed. Further, the primary source of
prior art examined by the USPTO is, in general, its own database of items already patented, that
is, Section 102(e) art. Since the USPTO has not been issuing patents on “pure” software (as
distinguished from traditional patent subject matter such as rubber molds or medical diagnostic
equipment which are controlled by computer programs), the USPTO consequently does not have
a large database of internal prior art to search to determine whether or not the current applications
are novel and non-obvious. The USPTO has established relations with outside databases, but is
constrained in attempts to ask specific questions about specific technologies by the requirement
under Section 122 that the application remain confidential.
Recent issued patents have fanned the flames of controversy surrounding the quality of
the USPTO’s output. “A building block training system and training method” is directed to a
“method of training cleaners of facilities to be used on the job which utilizes a plurality of
pictorial displays. . .,” that is, training janitors with picture books. Patent No. 5,851,117 (issued
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Of course, these cases were decided during the Internet explosion and ecommerce patenting informs the debate. Business Method Patents are
commonly understood to include e-commerce patents such as Amazon’s “oneclick,”138 Doubleclicks advertising technique,139 Linkserve’s referral
commission systems,140 billing methods,141 and Priceline’s reverse auction.142
The understanding of Business Method Patents by technology developers
and patent practitioners includes a range of definitions. The most narrow
would include only those techniques without novelty beyond their “business”
techniques for, say, accounting, shopping or inventory control, such as the ecommerce patents. A slightly broader range encompasses data processing, as
is evidenced by the USPTO Class 705 definitions. An even broader
understanding includes both the business technique and the software
implementing it. Thus, history does not define Business Method Patents, but it
is an important backdrop for consideration of what the Court will judge to be
an appropriate scope for the new Prior User Defense.
C. Section 102(g) Prior Art Case Law
Before being recognized as patentable, business method technologies
(often software implemented) were typically protected as trade secrets. Trade
secret prior art is capable of invalidating patents, but the case law defining
when and how this may happen is not well developed. Proprietary know how
that may help establish prior user rights against an asserted Business Method
Patent, may also help invalidate a non-business method patent. In fact, there is
no reason why Prior User Rights and 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) cannot both be plead
as alternative affirmative defenses to the same patent.
In case law interpreting 35 U.S.C § 102(g) patent validity challenges,143 a
distinction has been made between “secret” prior use and “non-informing
Dec. 22, 1998). A “decorative figure assembly from combination of component bags,” is drawn
to a trash bag for holding raked leaves, which is decorated with a jack-o-lantern design. Patent
No. 5,989,095 (issued Nov. 23, 1999). This utility patent was recently upheld as valid over a
claim of obviousness. In re Denbiczak, 50 U.S.P.Q 2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
137. U.S. Patent No. 5,323,184 (issued June 21, 1994).
138. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 9, 1999).
139. U.S. Patent No. 5,948,061 (issued Sept. 7, 1999).
140. U.S. Patent No. 5,991,740 (issued Nov. 23, 1999).
141. U.S. Patent No. 5,905,726 (issued May 18, 1999).
142. U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207 (issued Aug. 11, 1998).
143. § 102 (g) states:
An inventor shall be entitled to a patent unless – (g) before the applicant’s invention
thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be considered
not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but
also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to
practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
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public” use. The leading cases are Gillman v. Stern144 and Dunlap Holdings,
Ltd. v. Ram Golf, Corp.145 Secret prior use has been construed to fall outside
the body of prior art capable of invalidating a patent. A use that is public, but
does not inform the public of how the public product was produced, has been
held capable of invalidating prior art in some cases.
i.

Gillman v. Stern

In Gillman v. Stern the technology in question manufactured quilts.146 In
assembly, quilts need to be “puffed” before they are sewn shut. The prior user
in this case was careful to maintain the secrecy of the pneumatic machine he
used to “puff” process his quilts. The technique would not be discernible to a
retailer of the quilts, purchaser of the quilts or competing quiltmaker.
The patent was held to be valid over the user’s process. The holding found
the process to be “. . .as strictly secret as possible, consistent with its
exploitation,”147 based upon facts that have since developed into the elements
of maintaining a trade secret. The machine was kept behind locked doors,
visitors were restricted and the employees were sworn to secrecy.
Since the secret process was not discernible from the product, Judge
Learned Hand wrote that “what had not in fact enriched the art should not
count”148 as invalidating prior art. In dicta, Hand considered the distinction
that had developed in the law between a “non-informing” public use and a
“secret” use. A non-informing public use was nevertheless an invalidating
prior use, even though it taught the public nothing. Hand criticized the
caselaw’s emphasis on public use of an end product as contrary to the
underlying theory of the law encouraging disclosure where the end product did
not inform the public of anything about the process.149

Although originally drafted as a priority dispute codification, the first sentence has come to
embody a separate classification of prior art from Section 102 (a), “A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless – (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the
applicant for a patent . . . . . .” which has been read to mean “public” knowledge or use by others.
Section 102(g), then, is distinguished in that “made by others” under Section 102(g) does not
necessarily mean used in public.
144. 114 F.2d 28 (2nd Cir. 1940), cert denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941).
145. 524 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976).
146. See U. S. Patent No. 1,919,674 (issued Dec. 12, 1970).
147. Gillman, 114 F.2d at 30.
148. Id. at 31.
149. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

PRIOR USER RIGHTS FOR BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

275

ii. Dunlap Holdings, Ltd. v. Ram Golf, Corp.
In Dunlap, the technology in question was a special cut-resistant material
used for the surface of golf balls.150 In that case, a prior user did not suppress
or conceal the material in his early sale of the golf balls in question. A later
asserted patent was held to be invalid because it was not novel; that is, it was
“anticipated” by the prior public release of the golf ball covers by another. The
Seventh Circuit held that although the public use did not inform the public of
the technology, the prior use still invalidated the patent held by the second
developer of the golf ball covers because the public had already received the
benefit of the golf balls themselves and also because it was “fair to presume
that the secret [composition of the golf ball cover] would be uncovered by
potential competitors long before the time when a patent would have expired if
the inventor had made a timely application and disclosure to the patent
office.”151
Finally, the Seventh Circuit articulated the equity argument of the Prior
User Rights advocates. It held that the first inventor is under no duty to patent
and is free to contribute his idea to the public voluntarily, or involuntarily
through a non-informing public use. “In either case, although he may forfeit
his entitlement to monopoly protection, it would be unjust to hold that such an
election should impair his right to continue diligent efforts to market the
product of his own invention.”152
It is important to note the distinction made by the court between the facts
before it and those of Gillman, and also Palmer v. Dudzik.153 Those cases
involved prior art trade secret machines where “the benefits of using the
machine were not made available to anyone besides the inventor.”154 In
Dunlap the later patented article in issue was the publicly distributed golf ball
cover, which was susceptible to reverse engineering.
iii. Section 102(b) Cases
This distinction made evident by the Dunlap court is further developed in
cases construing Section 102(b).155 The Section 102(b) line of cases, which

150. See U.S. Patent No. 3,454,280 (issued Aug. 31, 1985) for “Golf Balls Having Covers of
Ethylene-Unsaturated Monocarboxylic Acid Copolymer Compositions.”
151. Dunlap, 524 F.2d at 36.
152. Id.
153. 481 F.2d 1377 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
154. Dunlap, 524 F.2d at 484.
155. Section 102 (b) states, “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (b) the invention
was patented or described in a printed publication in this country or in a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States . . .” “Since 102(b) does not require public use or sale by another an
inventor’s own use of the invention may invalidate it, if he fails to file his patent application
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often touch on the subject of whether or nor a prior use was “public,” shed
light on the holdings of the Section 102(g) cases. It must be born in mind that
Section 102(g) analysis goes strictly to novelty, while Section 102(b) caselaw
is more often concerned with preventing an inventor from maintaining a
monopoly for longer that the patent term; first a practical monopoly through
secrecy and then a legal monopoly through patenting.156
A leading case in construing public use under Section 102(b) is W.L. Gore
& Associates v. Garlock, Inc.157 In that case, the technology in question was a
process for stretching Teflon industrial tape. Purchasers of the tape would be
unable to discern if it had been stretched or not, although it performed better
after stretching. In holding the patent valid and unanticipated by the prior use,
the court found that there was no evidence that the public could learn the
claimed process by examining the tape. The court held:
Early public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system. As between a prior
inventor who would benefit from a process by selling its product but
suppresses, conceals or otherwise keeps the process from the public, and a later
inventor who promptly files a patent application from which the public will
gain a disclosure of the process, the law favors the latter.158

It has consistently been held that “promoting the progress of the useful
arts” under the Constitution is best served by providing an incentive (a patent
monopoly) to those developing technology and to confer that benefit in
exchange for public disclosure, in order to enrich the public body of technical
knowledge. The refinement that these cases bring to the public policy
encouraging disclosure is this: if a use of a technology that produces a public
product from which competitors may be able to discern the trade secret
process, the product and the secret process that produced it will be held to be a
public use, which may invalidate a patent issued to one who comes later to the
technology. Such a non-informing public use is, in effect, still held to be
informing enough, because it will be reverse engineered and thereby enrich the
public knowledge. Such disclosure, albeit incomplete, justifies qualifying the
prior use as anticipating public use capable of invalidating a later patent. If the
process technology cannot be discerned by competitors from the pubic use of
the products of that technology, however, it is deemed to be “secret,” that is,
“suppressed or concealed” under Section 102(g). Accordingly, such a use is

within a year after his first public use or sale. The case law is well developed on what constitutes
“public use.”
156. See Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc. 525 U.S. 55 (1998); Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon
Bearing, 68 U.S.P.Q. 54 (2nd Cir. 1946); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 219 U.S.P.Q.
13 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
157. 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
158. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1550.
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not a public use that can invalidate by anticipation a patent issued to a second
developer of the technology.159
Thus a first developer of a process technology is free to choose trade secret
protection over patent protection,160 but by maintaining the technology’s use as
secret, its developer risks having that same technology developed later by a
competitor who patents and who will then be entitled to enjoin the first
developer’s use of that technology. It is accurately noted by advocates of Prior
User Rights that the results of this legal framework are harsh. That is, one or
the other of the parties will lose all their rights. If suppressed or concealed, as
by a trade secret, the first developer who does not patent risks losing its trade
secret, and losing its right to practice the technology. If the technology use is
deemed a “non-informing” public use, the second developer-patentee risks
invalidation of the patent.161

159. See generally E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum, Co., 849 F.2d 1430,
1436 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Thompson S.A. v. Quixote, Corp. 166 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Comm’n, 54 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1995), Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); New Idea Farm Equip. Corp. v. Sperry
Corp., 916 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
160. See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
161. Notably, in both Gillman and Dunlap, the defendants challenged patent validity with the
prior use of a third party. This will not arise with the new defense because it is personal under §
273(b)(6). In other words, patentees remain at least as vulnerable to the still available § 102(g)
invalidation as they were before and, to the extent that the new defense encourages trade secret
protection and those secrets are discoverable, the new defense may generate even more third party
prior art with which to challenge patents.
At least one commentator, F. Andrew Ubel, Who’s on First—The Trade Secret Prior
User or a Subsequent Patentee, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401 (1994), has argued
that the distinction is less an end in itself than it is a means to the end of balancing equities as the
court sees fit, in light of the harsh winner take all nature of § 102(g) and the Gore holding.
In Friction Division Products Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 658 F. Supp. 998,
3 USPQ.2d 1775 (Del. 1987), the defendant used its own prior trade secret use, not a third
party’s, as its defense. The product was Kevlar and the secret use was production process
development. In denying the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity for
Suppression and Concealment of the prior use, the Court held that “the process itself does not
have to be disclosed to the public in order to avoid a finding of abandonment, suppression or
concealment of the invention. Only the benefits of the inventors work need reach the public.” Id.
at 1787 (citing Dunlap, 524 F.2d at 36).
It is argued, then, that the “non-informing” public use versus the “secret” prior use
distinction is a malleable standard. The courts are more likely to find suppression and
concealment where an “ordinary infringer” defends upon the work of a third party, and more
likely to find the prior work is unconcealed, unsuppressed, invalidating § 102(g) art where the
defendant is relying on its own work. While this argument overlooks the fact that the winning
defense in Dunlap was based on the prior use of a third party (“Butch Wagner”), as was the losing
and criticized defense in Gillman (“Haas”), the point is well taken. The equities are palpable, and
the courts have been cognizant of them in ruling upon whether or not a prior use qualifies as §
102(g) invalidating art.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

278

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:245

Prior User Rights advocates point out that this Draconian result is avoided
with Prior User Rights, which allow the first developer to continue to use its
trade secret technology should it elect to not patent it, and also allows the
second developer who elects patenting to continue to hold a valid patent good
against the rest of the world.162 However, the harsh results of Section 102(g)
are also often understood as promoting settlement by licensing, since the risk
of losing all their rights is a powerful motivator to both parties.163 Presumably,
Prior User Rights will remove this incentive to settle.
In any case this line of case law may prove to be useful in defining the
scope of the “First Inventor Defense.” Prior uses that produce a public product
may be distinguished as worthy of the defense or not based upon whether the
product motivates those who would be interested in developing a similar
technology by suggesting to them how they might go about it.
V. ARE BUSINESS METHODS NON-INFORMING PUBLIC USES?
A variety of criteria can be used to define Business Method Patents, and
with them the scope of the new defense. Definitional criteria should be
selected to harmonize the new defense with existing patent law, to support time
honored public policies of disclosure and to promote certainty among
intellectual property practitioners, developers and investors. One criterion
deserving consideration is whether the prior use would qualify as a “noninforming” public use under pre-existing Section 102(g) case law. Dunlap
recognized some equities on behalf of a prior user, and sought to justify
holding in accordance with them by reasoning that the disclosure of a prior
user was sufficient even if incomplete. The characteristics of Business
Methods lend themselves well to such an approach.
Moreover, nothing in the “First Inventor Defense” statute makes assertion
of the defense mandatory.164 Should a defendant care to brave the risk of
losing trade secret protection, the defense of invalidating the asserted patent on
Section 102(g) grounds is still available, and indeed may be pled as an
alternative affirmative defense.
The line of software patentability cases leading up to State Street Bank
suggests a range of boundaries by which Business Method Patents could be
selectively defined. Most narrow is that they are those patents whose novelty
resides in the conduct of business, not in the software that implements it.165

162. Opponents of Prior User Rights point out that this has the effect of removing the
technology from the marketplace for a period of time longer than the statutorily endorsed twentyyear patent term.
163. This is the reason for . . . the paucity of 102(g) caselaw.
164. “It shall be a defense . . . .” AIPA, 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (1999) (emphasis added).
165. See E. Robert Yoches, Business Method Patent Litigation, available at
http://www.dayton.edu/~/lawtech/papers/Chapter%2015.hto (last visited June 15, 2001).
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For e-commerce patents such as the Amazon “One-Click” patent,166 the novel
aspect is quite clear and easily reverse engineered. Certainly, if previously
used, such displayed functionality would qualify as an informing public use
available to invalidate under Section 102(b) a patent issued to a later
developer. It is difficult to conceive of such e-commerce patents as
“suppressed or concealed” under Section 102(g).
USPTO Class 705 is defined, however, as “data processing.” Business
Methods are also agreed to include such methods as the Signature Financial
mutual fund reconciling program. Clearly the “hub and spoke” patent at issue
in State Street Bank took in data and processed it to output different useful,
concrete and tangible data sets. Although this may be a “backroom” process
vis-à-vis the public at large, if the relevant public is taken to be the competitors
of the patent holder, then the awareness of the patented program’s functional
capabilities may also prove to be as informing as the Dunlap golf ball cover.
Accordingly the patent may still be vulnerable to invalidation by a qualifying
and anticipating prior use. Under Section 102(g), to the extent that these
services can be offered while suppressing and concealing the software
implementing them, the functionality of the program will still be known to
competitors, and would motivate them to engineer competing products.
Even if the definition of Business Method Patents is taken to be broad
enough in scope to include implementing software, Section 102(g) defenses
may still be an option worth considering for an accused first user. It is widely
accepted that software development over the last quarter century has been
highly incremental in nature. Many patented processes are thought to be
obvious in that the problems they address could have been solved by an
ordinarily skilled practitioner of the programming arts simply by applying any
of a variety of preexisting programming techniques.167 In other words, most
software is so easily reverse engineered that putting a method to use while
suppressing and concealing its implementing software from a relevant
audience of competitors will still serve to be a substantially informing use.
If the foregoing is accepted to be true, then many Business Method Patents
are highly susceptible to reverse engineering once the functions the software
performs are used in public. Hence, it appears that a great bulk of products and
services implemented by software would properly be considered “noninforming” public uses under the Section 102(g) case law. Accordingly, if
Prior User Rights under the new act are construed to cover business method
subject matter which would qualify as a “non-informing” public use under
Section 102(g), even though optimal techniques (the best mode) are suppressed

166. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 9, 1999).
167. See Legal Resources and Tools for Surviving the Patenting Frenzy of the Internet,
Bioinformatics, and Electronic Commerce, at http://www.bustpatents.com (last visited May 29,
2001).
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and concealed as trade secrets, the new defense would seem to do the least
violence to the traditional patent system. Finally, given the short life cycle of
software, such a rule would do little practical harm either.
In sum, the new defense is tailored for application under the “suppressed
and concealed” language of Section 102(g). The case law construing that
statute has sought to ameliorate the harsh results of Section 102(g) for those
who inform the public to some extent beyond absolute secrecy, in order to
preserve the public policy favoring disclosure. In so doing, these cases point to
a useful element worthy of inclusion in whatever definition of “methods of
doing or conducting business” the courts devise. The defense should not apply
beyond those methods that do not inform the public enough to motivate
competitors to build on the disclosed functionality. Such a holding would
afford technology developers as much predictability in this area as they had
before the advent of the “First Inventor Defense.”
VI. CONCLUSION
Major recent decisions in patent law168 have sought to promote
predictability in the application of patent rights and certainty of the boundaries
of those rights for the relevant community of technology generators and their
investors. The undefined scope of the “First Inventor Defense” runs counter to
that policy. The courts have been left the task of applying the defense in a
manner that preserves as much as possible public policy in favor of certainty
and disclosure while affording relief to earlier users according to the Act. One
approach is to allow the defense insofar as the prior use provides some
information to the public, as Business Methods inherently do anyway, in view
of Section 102(g) case law on “non-informing” public use. To the extent that
such an approach limits the controversial new defense, and to the extent it
would expand the range of Section 103 art available to invalidate controversial
business method patents, it would also serve to return the patent system to its
traditional status. To the extent that the courts are persuaded by the facts
presented to them that the equities served by the new defense can be consistent
with the public policy favoring disclosure, the new defense has an opportunity
to grow into a broader regime from a narrow exception, as it should now
properly be construed.

168. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kobashiki Co. v. Festo Crop., 234 F.3d 558; (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. HiltonDavis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 1153 (1997).

